We investigate the drivers of EMU big fours' business cycles in a DSGE model. Our approach allows to disentangle the role of demand and technology shocks, where the latter may generate permanent consequences on national productivity levels. For the years before the …nancial crisis we cannot …nd evidence of a demand-driven boom in Spain and Italy relative to what happened in France and Germany. The aftermath of the sovereign bond crisis was characterized by a sequence of adverse permanent technology shocks both in Spain and in Italy. These latter results are consistent with recent theoretical developments that emphasize the adverse supply-side e¤ects of a credit crunch.
Introduction
The creation of the European Monetary Union (EMU) in 1999 was heralded as the beginning of a new phase of prosperity and relatively fast growth, potentially leading to convergence between peripheral and core countries. The early EMU years seemed to con…rm this prediction, but the sovereign bond crisis severely hit the "peripheral" members and raised concerns of a possible breakup of the Euro Area, due to the persistent growth gap between the core and the periphery.
These patterns are well exempli…ed by output growth dynamics in the four largest EMU countries - In peripheral countries the early EMU years had been characterized by relatively loose domestic credit conditions, and by real exchange rate appreciations. These phenomena were initially seen as part of the catching up process triggered by monetary integration (Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2002) .
After the onset of the 2010 sovereign bond crisis a "new view" has suggested that favorable credit conditions triggered a surge in consumers demand and, by falling short of stimulating productivity convergence, determined demand-driven erosion of competitiveness in these countries (Giavazzi and Theoretical contributions have explored the supply-side e¤ects of a credit crunch. Khan and Thomas (2013) show that …nancial shocks penalize …rms characterized by relatively high productivity but relatively low net worth, thereby causing reductions in aggregate total factor productivity.
Bassetto et al. (2014) argue that a credit crunch has a particularly severe e¤ect on small …rms production. Buera et al. (2015) obtain a similar result focusing on employment dynamics. This alternative view emphasizes that the supply-side e¤ects of a credit crunch bear important policy implications. In fact, Laeven and Valencia (2013) …nd that …rms exposed to external …nance greatly bene…ced from bank recapitalization plans and …scal policies designed to stimulate domestic demand.
The paper investigates the drivers behind business cycle dynamics in EMU four largest economies.
One may expect this model to answer two questions which are crucial to the de…nition of policies designed to restore growth in the southern economies. Was the pre-2007 relatively fast growth in the south driven by demand shocks or was there also some favorable productivity component?
How can we explain the post-2010 dismal performance of these countries? Was it due to lack of domestic demand, including contractionary …scal policies, or was it caused by a slowdown in the underlying rate of productivity growth?
We consider a number of country-speci…c technology and demand shocks. Technology shocks include standard temporary TFP shocks and shocks to the productivity growth trend, entailing for each country permanent variations in productivity levels relative to the rest of the Eurozone. These latter shocks are often neglected in empirical DSGE models. Non-policy demand shocks include "risk premium" shocks driving a wedge between the return on capital accruing to the households and the price of capital services paid by …rms, and standard investment-speci…c shocks.
Our results challenge the view that loose domestic (private and/or public) demand conditions in the early EMU years are at the root of the Eurozone crisis. In spite of the expansionary credit cycle, we …nd no evidence of a large demand-driven boom in Italy or Spain before the …nancial crisis, while in this period favorable demand shocks played an important role in Germany and France. It is interesting to note that the hypothesis of a credit-(demand-) driven boom is also rejected by Chouard et al. (2014) , who use a reduced-form equation of total factor productivity dynamics. As for …scal policy, we cannot …nd evidence of an expansionary bias in discretionary public consumption in the southern economies. In fact the contribution of …scal shocks in Spain is comparable to what we observe for France or Germany, whereas in Italy the …scal shocks were larger but did not induce a systematic expansion.
Demand shocks remain crucial to explain the 2008 slump and the subsequent post-2010 modest recovery in Germany and, to a lesser extent, in France. Adverse permanent technology shocks explain the post-2008 severe output losses observed for Italy. The same conclusion applies to Spain after 2010. Thus, the severe output contractions in Italy and Spain should not be interpreted as the necessary correction of accumulated imbalances. They signal instead a North-South divide, determined by a permanent technology gap. This is broadly consistent with the view that the crisis is the consequence of the supply side e¤ects of the banking crisis in the South. Ball (2014) estimates the e¤ects of the …nancial crisis on potential output in a panel of OECD countries, including the four countries considered here. It is interesting to note that his ranking of the …nancial crisis e¤ects …ts very well our results. Potential output in Germany was virtually unscathed, France su¤ered a break in potential output growth of relatively limited importance, a severe disruption is observed for Italy and Spain.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 motivates our focus on permanent technology shocks highlighting the connections between our theoretical and empirical modelling strategies. Section 3 introduces the estimation strategy and section 4 presents the results. Finally, section 5 concludes.
Modelling strategy
Right from the outset, it is worth to emphasize the connections between our theoretical and empirical modelling strategies. The theoretical DSGE literature incorporating non-trivial …nancial frictions and a banking sector has been rapidly expanding since the outset of the …nancial crisis. 1 Unfortunately, empirical DSGE models (Brzoza-Brzezina and Kolasa, 2013; Suh and Walker, 2016) …nd that modelling …nancial frictions is essential for replicating ‡uctuations in …nancial variables, but the ampli…cation mechanism caused by …nancial frictions has relatively weak e¤ects of real variables and is not su¢ cient to improve over the statistical …t of the workhorse New Keynesian model, such as Smets and Wouters (2007) .
It is also important to notice that recent empirical DSGE models of the …nancial crisis utterly neglect the potential role of permanent productivity shocks. Gerali et al. (2010) apply an HP …lter to trending variables; others, such as Suh and Walker (2016) and Lindé, Smets and Wouters (2016) impose a deterministic trend. One standard justi…cation for this approach is that the low frequency features of data series bear relatively negligible importance for empirical models that 1 One common feature of the …nancial frictions modelled in the above mentioned contributions is that a credit crunch a¤ects demand for consumption and investment goods, but it has no e¤ect on the growth rate of productivity.
focus on the short-term behavior of the economy.
In sharp contrast with these studies, Sims (2011) emphasizes the importance of jointly considering the roles of the persistent but transitory productivity shocks of the RBC-DSGE literature and of the permanent shocks identi…ed in the VAR literature (Galí, 1999) . He shows that incorporating permanent technology shocks in an empirical DSGE model allows to achieve a better match of the empirical responses to technology shocks with fewer frictions than in standard empirical DSGE models.
We contribute to the existing literature identifying the distinct role played by demand factors and variations in productivity growth during the two crises. In the light of the apparent di¢ culty of improving the empirical performance of DSGE models by explicitly adding …nancial frictions, we have chosen to incorporate permanent technology shocks in an otherwise standard DSGE model, without dealing explicitly with the …nancial frictions, as Kollman et al. (2016) .
Consistently with our results, they …nd that the relatively bad performance of the Euro Area re ‡ects a combination of adverse aggregate demand and supply shocks, including permanent TFP shocks In concluding this discussion it is important to stress the di¤erent approaches to the measurement of permanent TFP shocks relative to more conventional studies. The early RBC literature focused on persistent but transitory changes in the measured Solow residual as a source of technology shocks. This approach is criticized because the procyclical behavior of the Solow residual may be due to cyclical errors in measuring changes in capital utilization and/or in the intensity of work e¤ort (Basu, 1996) . As a consequence, Basu et al. (2006) advocate the adjustment of the Solow residual, controlling for imperfect competition and time varying utilization of capital and labor. Sims (2011) shows that the Basu et al. TFP measure incorporates both permanent and temporary but persistent shocks. Our approach is obviously di¤erent because we estimate temporary and permanent technology shocks jointly with a number of temporary demand and markup shocks, as it is typical of the empirical DSGE literature. Instead of being treated as a residual, in our framework technology shocks are identi…ed on the grounds of their ability to explain permanent comovements of observed variables, including permanent variations of the capital labor ratio and of consumption levels. Our contributions is therefore quite distinct from earlier work on TFP in the Eurozone, such as Cette et al. (2016) and Gamberoni et al. (2016) .
Our empirical strategy de…nes the theoretical characterization of a monetary union economy.
As we discuss in section 3 below, we estimate a two-country monetary union model for each of the four countries. This option is preferred to the alternative of estimating a multi-country model for the whole Eurozone, which would be intractable. 2 We therefore assume that the monetary union and own …rms. In our framework introducing Non-Ricardian households is an admittedly roughand-ready method to capture the impossibility for some households to exploit …nancial markets to smooth their consumption over the business cycle and also to better characterize the response of aggregate demand to public consumption shocks. De Bortoli and Galí (2017) show that this simple two-agent New Keynesian model (TANK) is a tractable framework that captures reasonably well the main predictions of HANK models which are based on a detailed description of agents heterogeneity (Kaplan et al. 2016 ). 3 The model incorporates an exogenous …scal sector, including public consumption, tax rates on factor incomes, transfers and lump sum taxes. Factor incomes taxation and transfers are assumed constant and used to calibrate relative consumption between the two households groups, as in Coenen et al. (2013) . Public consumption is one among the observables used to estimate the model and we assume that its cyclical pattern is driven by exogenous shocks whereas lump-sum taxation of Ricardian households ensures government solvency.
The technical Appendix provides a full description of the model. In what follows we focus on certain aspects of the model that are crucial to understand our results, i.e. characterization of preferences and shocks.
The representative …rm producing intermediate goods uses the following production technology:
where int de…nes …xed costs of production, u int t is the degree of capacity utilization, K int t is the capital stock, h int t is the labor bundle:
Firm int demand for labor type j is
of labor that …rms demand at W j t . 4 The time-varying parameter w t allows to incorporate wage markup shocks:
is a temporary technology shock, such that log "
and z t = z t 1 g z;t is a labour-augmenting non-stationary technology shifter where
allows to incorporate technology shocks with a permanent e¤ect on the level of productivity.
Intermediate …rms operate in the domestic tradable and non-tradable sectors, T and N respectively. They face downward sloping demand curves obtained from standard consumption bundles
where markup shocks, i.e. shocks to the elasticity of substitution across goods are assumed to follow an AR(1) process with i.i.d. Normal error term:
The …nal consumption bundle is: 
where C T t is de…ned as:
Tradables incorporate domestic C H t and imported C , are normalized with the technology shifter z t . The term " c t is a preference shock a¤ecting the subjective discount factor and evolving according to:
Ricardian households allocate their resources between consumption C 
, respectively denote consumption, labor and capital income tax rates, social contributions levied on labor incomes, and lump-sum taxes: P C;t and P I;t are the price indexes for consumption and investment goods bundles; R k t is the rental rate of capital, a (u
de…nes variable capacity utilization costs, and " b t is a risk premium shock that creates a wedge between the return on capital accruing to the households and the price of capital paid by …rms. 6 log " Physical capital accumulates as follows:
where is the depreciation rate and " i t denotes an investment-speci…c technology shock:
The term S represents standard investment adjustment costs.
Public consumption is exogenous and stochastic:
where lower case letters stand for variables adjusted for growth, i.e. g t = G t =z t , and g, y de…ne
steady state values.
As in Christo¤el et al. (2008) , the common monetary authority sets the nominal interest rate according to the following log-linear Taylor rule:
where '^' denotes log deviations from steady state. 
Estimation strategy
The model is log-linearized around its steady state and then estimated using Bayesian techniques.
Right from the outset, we have chosen to follow Smets and Wouters (2007) who do not adopt the standard practice of pre-…ltering data to remove low frequency components. In our framework this is important because we are interested in identifying low frequency components, such as the permanent productivity shocks, and the short to medium term responses to such shocks. As pointed out in Canova (2014) cyclical ‡uctuations may arise in consequence of both permanent and transitory shocks. 7 Ferroni (2011) is also critical of Smets and Wouters (2007) who impose a deterministic trend when di¤erencing trending observables. In fact their choice requires very strong a priori (deterministic nature) of the productivity growth process and imposes that all volatility is determined by transitory disturbances. In this regard, even if we estimate a BGP deterministic component for all trending variables, we also allow for the possibility that volatility is caused by a stochastic non-transitory component of productivity growth. Note that the stochastic component of productivity growth may vary across countries, so this is crucial to capture convergence/divergence productivity patterns. Moreover, we let the data speak about such patterns. 8 We adopt a two-stage approach. In the …rst stage we estimate a closed economy model in order to obtain estimates for the deterministic productivity trend and for the parameters of the Central Bank policy rule, including the in ‡ation objective. 9 All these estimated values are then imposed in the second stage, when we estimate the four two-country models.
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The data sample is 1996Q2-2013Q3, due to data availability and to the di¢ culty of estimating the model after 2013Q3, when monetary policy was de facto constrained by the zero lower bound. 
where is the estimated quarterly steady-state in ‡ation rate.
The nominal interest rate is de…ned as:
with R corresponding to the steady state nominal interest rate. For the remaining, non stationary variables, which are detrended by the employment trend as in Christo¤el et al. (2008), 11 we assume the following measurement equation:
where = 100(g z 1) andĝ z;t respectively denote the estimated deterministic and stochastic growth trend components.
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This closed-economy model is estimated assuming interest rate, risk premium, investmentspeci…c, price and wage markup, government spending, temporary and permanent productivity shocks.
Second-stage estimates
In the second stage we use 9 time series characterizing the speci…c domestic country, which consist in real GDP, real private consumption, consumer price in ‡ation (log di¤erence in the overall For each model, we estimate the employment trend coe¢ cients g e and g e . Then, the employment measurement equations are de…ned as:
ln e t g e t =ê t + e ln e t g e t =ê t + e 11 In Smets and Wouters (2007) these variables are expressed per capita by dividing with the population over 16. Our chice is motivated by the cross-country di¤erent long-run changes in participation and employment rates. 12 For obvious reasons g
EM U e
does not a¤ect the measurement equation for the real wage both in the …rst-and in the second-stage estimates. 
As shown above, for each of the 4 models we consider an interest rate shock and, a set of country-speci…c shocks: two transitory sectoral TFP shocks, one shock to the productivity trend, a risk premium shock, an investment-speci…c shock, a preference shock, a government spending shock, price and wage markup shocks.
For sectoral in ‡ation variables, the observation equations are:
where is set according to the …rst-stage estimates.
For the remaining non stationary variables the measurement equations are:
ln Y t =ŷ t ŷ t 1 + +ĝ z;t + g e (22) were is retrieved from …rst-stage estimates. Note that we detect important di¤erences in the g e values estimated for the 4 countries, ranging between 0.139 for Germany and 0.53 for Spain (see Table 1 ). This, in turn, implies important changes in the dispersion of our observables. To gauge these e¤ects in Figure 2 we plot the observables for GDP growth adjusted for the employment trend ( ln Y t g e ) which can be easily compared with the actual growth rates reported in Figure   1 . It is easy to see that employment detrending reduces dispersion of GDP growth rates before the …nancial crisis and increases it afterwards.
Figure 2: GDP growth (adjusted for employment trend) -EMU largest economies
For government expenditures we impose the following measurement equations:
whereĝ t is de…ned as gt g y .
Calibration and priors
We calibrate a number of parameters at the same level for all EMU countries. Following Christo¤el et al. (2008) , the discount factor is …xed at 0:9988, the steady-state depreciation rate is 0:025, the capital shares int are set at 0:3, the steady state net price and wage markups are …xed at 35%
and 30% respectively, redistributive transfers are assumed to determine a steady state consumption ratio c rt =c o = 0:8.
Another set of parameters are calibrated using average sample data. For each of the four countries in Table 1 tax rates are average sample ratios between the relevant revenue and tax-base series. 14 We use average sample ratios for calculating government-spending-to-GDP and debt-to-GDP ratios. 15 As pointed out above, parameters g
EM U e
, g e and g e are obtained from OLS estimates of ln e t .
The remaining parameters are estimated with Bayesian techniques. Priors, reported in Table   1 In the closed economy model, we estimate the monetary authority's long-run (net) quarterly in ‡ation objective 100 ( 1) assuming a prior mean of 0:5% (2% in annual terms), consistent with the ECB's quantitative de…nition of price stability. The trend growth rate of the economy is estimated with a Normal distribution with mean 0:6 (corresponding to 2:4% in annual terms) and 0:1 standard deviation. The parameters of the Taylor rule are normally distributed. 16 Risk aversion and the inverse of Frisch elasticity are Normally distributed, whereas the parameter de…ning investment adjustment costs is Gamma distributed. 
Results
Our estimates of the policy rule parameters and of the productivity growth trend are reported in Table 2 . Table 3 shows the country-speci…c posterior mean estimates of structural parameters 18 obtained in the four countries second-stage estimates. 19 We obtain fairly similar posterior estimates for the four countries, which are well identi…ed.
We observe important cross-country di¤erences in the fraction of LAMP consumers, which is particularly large in Germany and small in Spain. This evidence can be rationalized following Kaplan et al. (2014) who suggest that is composed by "poor hand-to-mouth" consumers, who do not hold any type of assets, and "wealthy hand-to-mouth" consumers who cannot smooth consumption over the business cycle because their wealth is concentrated in illiquid assets, such as housing. For the countries considered here they estimate a similar ranking for the fraction of illiquid households, but cross-country di¤erences are relatively smaller. for these parameters in Spain. 18 Estimate results about shocks parameters are reported in Table 2 of the Online Appendix. 19 Visual diagnostics of the estimation results are available upon request. The posterior distributions are computed considering 4 Monte Carlo Markov chains of 250,000 draws each, with 20% draws being discarded as burn-in draws. The average acceptance rate is comprised between 28 and 34 percent. 
Variance decompositions
The output variance decomposition (Table 4) highlights the di¤erent role played by supply and demand shocks in the four countries. Demand shocks played a relatively limited role in the souther countries. In Italy technology shocks and, to a lesser extent, public consumption shocks explain a relatively larger fraction of output growth volatility. Domestic (price) markup shocks were particularly important in Germany and Spain. Turning to the in ‡ation variance decomposition (Table 5) , we see that a combination of technology and mark up shocks explains the bulk of in ‡ation volatility in all countries. Finally, volatility of the public consumption ratio is explained by non-policy shocks in all countries but Italy, where …scal discretion was the main source of volatility (Table 6 ). All in all, the variance decompositions emphasize the limited role played by demand shocks in explaining the volatility of GDP growth and in ‡ation in southern countries.
Historical decompositions
In this section, we present the historical decompositions for the growth rates of output, exchange rate, real wages index and public-consumption-to-GDP ratio (Figures 4, 6, 7 and 8, respectively) .
We address the key question whether exceedingly favorable demand conditions predated the …-nancial crisis episodes or whether the sovereign bond crisis should be seen as a game changer that created a new economic environment within the Eurozone.
Output growth
To begin our discussion it may be helpful to look at the historical decomposition for the whole Output growth decomposition for Spain highlights some speci…c business cycle features. First, the pre-2008 high-growth period is characterized by a combination of favorable demand and tech-nology shocks, where the latter were mainly characterized by permanent shocks. The global …nancial crisis period is marked by adverse demand shocks. Since 2010, the onset of the sovereign bond crisis is associated to a sequence of adverse permanent productivity shocks that were decisive to determine the growth slowdown. Relative to Italy, public expenditure shocks had a very limited in ‡uence on GDP growth, but after 2010 we observe an increase in their amplitude.
Real exchange rate growth
According to popular wisdom the early EMU years where characterized by exchange rate appreciations in the periphery. As a matter of fact, the Italian real exchange rate mainly depreciated prior to the crisis, and domestic demand conditions contributed to this outcome. Spain is the only country which was characterized by pre-…nancial crisis appreciation. Our decomposition highlights the overwhelming role played by technology shocks in determining this outcome.
Real wage growth
Demand driven wage increases have been singled out as the main culprit of competitiveness losses in the south of the Eurozone. In fact neither country was characterized by wage growth rates that systematically exceeded the corresponding wage growth rates for the rest of the Eurozone.
Moreover, demand shocks played a limited role in determining wage dynamics in these two countries before the onset of the …nancial crisis. After 2010 technology shocks became the dominant force behind the observed slowdown in wage growth rates.
Public consumption ratios
As mentioned above, in Italy public consumption shocks were relatively more important up to 2010, but we cannot identify a tendency to implement undisciplined discretionary policies. After 2010 the public consumption ratio is remarkably more stable. Germany, Italy and Spain share a tendency to implement accommodative discretionary policies: shocks often drive the ratio in the same direction of non-policy shocks. In France the ratio is almost entirely determined by non-policy shocks.
Summing up
Our results cannot support the view that pre-2007 growth in the two southern countries was driven by a demand boom. Perhaps surprisingly, favorable demand conditions were relatively more important in France and in Germany. Competitiveness indicators, measured by real exchange rate and wage growth con…rm this conclusion, as demand factors played a negligible role in determining these variables in Italy and Spain.
One striking result is that asymmetric shocks to the productivity trend play a non-negligible role in explaining the favorable performance of Spain before the crisis, and are major determinants of the turnaround in growth perspectives for the two southern countries after 2010.
Given the di¤erential role of permanent technology shocks in the 4 countries, in Figure 9 for each country we plot the estimated productivity growth rates ln (g z;t ) for the four countries. Results One might wonder whether our results concerning the importance of permanent technology shocks might be due to model misspeci…cation, possibly due to our choice to abstract from explicit modelling of …nancial frictions. To answer this question in Figure 10 we report the IRFs to a temporary shock to the productivity growth rate estimated for Spain. A temporary slowdown in productivity growth has a contractionary e¤ect. Consumption is reduced, investment output and hours worked fall, along with the real wage and in ‡ation. Relative to temporary contractionary shocks there are two key distinct features: the …rst is that Ricardian consumers now react to the permanent income reduction and their willingness to smooth consumption is therefore limited, the second is that the shock causes permanent adjustments in the long run. In fact neither e¤ect could possibly materialize in DSGE models which account for banking frictions but neglect stochastic growth trends, such as the ones estimated in Brzoza-Brzezina and Kolasa (2013).
To conclude our discussion, note that the de ‡ationary impact of the shock determines a real depreciation both in the short and in the long run. This last result allows to provide an alternative interpretation of the persistent real exchange rate appreciation observed for Spain before the …nancial crisis, in sharp contrast with the view that interprets it as the consequence of a demand boom. 
Conclusions
According to a popular wisdom, loose domestic credit conditions and undisciplined …scal policies generated an illusory boom in the Eurozone southern economies, leading to competitiveness deterioration. These were the underlying factors that eventually led to sovereign bond crisis.
We cannot …nd support for this thesis in the cases of Spain and Italy, which account for 90% of the size of EMU southern economies. In fact, pre-2007 dynamics of growth and in ‡ation in these two countries were not systematically stimulated by demand shocks. Further, the post-2010 severe output contraction experienced in these two countries was mainly determined by permanent adverse technology shocks. Thus the output losses experienced in these countries cannot be interpreted as a one-o¤ price to pay in order to restore external competitiveness. Further, achieving cyclical recovery will not be su¢ cient to restore the relative income level that these countries had reached before the crisis.
To the extent that the slow down in productivity growth was the consequence of a credit crunch, our results suggest that macroeconomic policies should promote credit availability and favorable external …nancing conditions for innovative …rms, and attempt to generate adequate domestic demand stimulus. In this regard it is interesting to note the relatively favorable growth performance of the Spanish economy in the last couple of years. In that country the government managed to free domestic banks from the burden of non-performing loans and was also allowed to escape the 3% de…cit ceiling, whereas in Italy the solution to bank problems was delayed and the EMU rules limited …scal ‡exibility due to the large stock of outstanding public debt.
